Settlements as Sales under the Bankruptcy Code
Peter J.Davist
INTRODUCTION

When a debtor enters bankruptcy, the Bankruptcy Code gives the
trustee (or debtor in possession) control over managing the assets of
the estate. The trustee can sell or use these assets only after meeting
requirements laid out in the Code. To sell an asset of the estate, the
trustee must meet the requirements found in 11 USC § 363, which
include providing notice to affected parties and a bankruptcy court
hearing.
The trustee has more than just the power to sell assets of the estate.
When a debtor has an outstanding cause of action against a third party,
the Code gives the trustee the power to litigate or settle.' Circuit courts
disagree over whether a settlement of a cause of action should be
classified as a sale under § 363. One circuit always treats settlements as
sales,' reasoning that § 363 is implicated because a cause of action is an
asset of the estate that is sold by the trustee. Other circuits sometimes
treat settlements as sales.' Still another circuit never treats settlements
as sales, reasoning that reaching a compromise to settle a cause of
action is fundamentally different from selling an asset.
The Code favors settlements,' because settling disputes saves
parties the time, money, and uncertainty of litigation.' It is, therefore,
important to know what level of court involvement in settlements the
Bankruptcy Code requires-that is, whether courts need to approve
settlements. When the trustee does settle, creditors want some
assurance that the trustee bargained for the best deal possible, and
court approval of the settlement serves this function. But whether
bankruptcy courts can review settlement agreements depends on how
the Bankruptcy Code is interpreted. However, construing the Code is
t
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problematic because it does not directly address whether settlements
require court approval. Settlements may be reviewed by the bankruptcy
court at the trustee's discretion and do not have the same procedural
protections of sales under § 363.
This Comment adopts the position that settlements are
sometimes sales. Furthermore, this Comment provides a framework to
determine when settlements are sales, something courts have failed to
do. This framework is based on a settlement's characteristics outside
bankruptcy law because the law inside bankruptcy deviates from
nonbankruptcy law only when there is a sufficient justification
requiring the change.! Some settlements have qualities distinct from
sales and so do not require similar treatment in the Bankruptcy Code.
These settlements do not require a departure from the nonbankruptcy
baseline, because the procedures of § 363 do not advance the purpose
of the provision to maximize the value of the estate. Instead, a change
from the nonbankruptcy baseline for these settlements has the
opposite effect by adding to the administrative costs of settling a
dispute. When settling a dispute has the legal qualities of a sale outside
bankruptcy, courts should review it under § 363. When a settlement
does not resemble a sale outside bankruptcy, courts should leave it to
the trustee's discretion.
Part I of this Comment provides an overview of the Code as well
as the structure and purposes of § 363. Part II describes the current
split among the circuit courts over whether settlements should be
considered "sales" for purposes of § 363. Part III argues that the
nonbankruptcy baseline should be the starting point for characterizing
settlements for the purposes of the Code. Finally, Part IV proposes a
framework that uses the nonbankruptcy baseline and then applies it to
a case in the split that this Comment argues should have come out
differently.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND § 363
When a corporation owes more than it can repay, a familiar
problem presents itself: the debtor cannot pay back all of its creditors
in full. Without bankruptcy law, creditors would react to this problem
by racing to the debtor's assets and attempting to get what was owed
to them before rival creditors could do the same. As with any race,
some creditors would win and some would lose. Bankruptcy law,
however, understanding that this race would make everyone worse off,
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solves this collective action problem. It stops the race by staying each
creditor's individual debt remedies and provides a single forum for an
efficient division and distribution of the debtor's assets. This Part first
provides relevant background on the structure of bankruptcy law. It
then discusses the substantive rule governing sales and the procedural
rule governing settlements.
A.

The Bankruptcy Structure

In 1978, Congress passed the Bankruptcy Reform Act,' which
codified the substantive law governing bankruptcy proceedings in the
Bankruptcy Code. The Code is divided into chapters, and the most
common bankruptcy petition is filed under Chapter 7.1o Chapter 7
provides for the liquidation of the debtor's estate and distribution of
the proceeds to the estate's creditors. In short, Chapter 7 provides a
"fresh start" for the debtor." In a Chapter 11 bankruptcy, however, the
debtor's estate is administered with the purpose of reorganizing and
preserving the debtor's business, allowing it to continue for the benefit
of the creditors.2
When a debtor enters bankruptcy, a bankruptcy estate is created
consisting of all of the debtor's legal or equitable interests, including
some causes of action." The debtor in possession or a court-appointed
trustee is then charged with administering the estate. In a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the trustee's main objective is to liquidate the estate
4 A debtor
efficiently while acting in the best interest of the creditors."
entering bankruptcy may have many outstanding claims against third
parties, and because litigation is slow and costly, bankruptcy favors
8 See Douglas G. Baird, The Initiation Problem in Bankruptcy, 11 Intl Rev L & Econ 223,
223 (1991) ("The premise of American bankruptcy law is that sometimes the creditors and
others who contributed capital to the firm are better off as a group than they would be if this
avenue of debt collection did not exist."); Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of
Bankruptcy Law 10 (Harvard 1986) ("Because creditors have conflicting rights, there is a
tendency in their debt-collection efforts to make a bad situation worse.").
9 Pub L No 95-598,92 Stat 2549, codified as amended at 11 USC § 101 et seq.
10 See DOJ, United States Trustee Program, Annual Report of Significant
Accomplishments: Fiscal Year 2009 11 table 2.1, online at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo
/public affairs/annualreport/docs/ar2009.pdf (visited Apr 17,2011) (showing that over 70 percent
of filings are under Chapter 7).
11 See Marrama v Citizens Bank of Massachusetts, 549 US 365, 367 (2007); Jackson, Logic
and Limits at 4 (cited in note 8) (noting that two roles of bankruptcy law are to provide a clean
slate for individuals and to provide an efficient forum for creditors).
12 See Alan N. Resnick and Harry J. Sommer, eds,7 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 1100.01 at 7-1100
(Matthew Bender 15th rev ed 2010).
13 11 USC § 541(a)(1). See also In the Matter of Seven Seas Petroleum, Inc, 522 F3d 575,
584 (5th Cir 2008) (noting that "whether a particular state-law claim belongs to the bankruptcy
estate depends on .. . applicable state law").
14 See In re Riverside-Linden Investment Co,925 F2d 320,322 (9th Cir 1991).
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settlement of these claims." The roles of the trustee and the
bankruptcy court in settling these disputes depend on whether they
fall within § 363.
B.

The Structure and Purposes of § 363(b) Sales of Assets

The Bankruptcy Code is designed for the efficient disposition of
the debtor's estate. A § 363(b) sale is one example of the Bankruptcy
Code's promotion of this purpose. Section 363(b) provides that "[t]he
trustee, after notice and a hearing, may use, sell, or lease, other than
in the ordinary course of business, property of the estate." Under
§ 363, when the trustee sells an asset of the estate, the proceeds from
the sale flow back to the estate for division and distribution among
the creditors. The following provisions of § 363 ensure that the trustee
receives the highest value for every asset he sells.
1. The notice and hearing requirements.
When a trustee sells an asset of the estate under § 363(b), notice
of the sale must be provided to the relevant parties, and a hearing
must be held in front of a bankruptcy judge. These provisions protect
the creditors by giving each interested party the right to object to the
sale, thereby increasing the likelihood that the trustee will obtain the
highest value for the asset being sold." Adequate notice from the
trustee provides the relevant parties with information on "(1) the
nature of the claims being sold under the Sale Motion, (2) how to
participate in the bidding process, if interested, and (3) the date by
which any objections were to be filed and served.""
The hearing requirements give the bankruptcy judge an
opportunity to ensure that the trustee is receiving the highest value for
the asset. The obligations of the trustee are provided by the Bankruptcy
Code, which states that "[t]he Trustee shall collect and reduce to money
the property of the estate ... and close such estate as expeditiously as is
compatible with the best interest of [the] parties."" When reviewing a
sale, courts enforce this obligation by placing a burden on the trustee to
15 See Protective Committee for Independent Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc v
Anderson,390 US 414,424 (1968) ("In administering reorganization proceedings ... it will often
be wise to arrange the settlement of claims."); In re Martin,91 F3d 389,393 (3d Cir 1996) (noting
the high frequency of settlements in bankruptcy proceedings).
16 See In re ContinentalAir Lines, Inc, 780 F2d 1223, 1226 (5th Cir 1986) ("[I]mplicit in
§ 363(b) is the further requirement of justifying the proposed transaction.... [T]here must be
some articulated business justification for using, selling, or leasing the property."). See also
Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collieron Bankruptcy 1 363.02 at 10-363 (cited in note 12).
17 In re Nicole Energy Services, Inc, 385 BR 201,234 (Bankr SD Ohio 2008).
18 11 USC § 704(a)(1).
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demonstrate that the sale maximizes the value of the estate." A trustee
is required to justify the terms of the sale: "As a general matter, the
trustee must demonstrate that the proposed sale price is the highest and
best offer, though a bankruptcy court may accept a lower bid in the
presence of sound business reasons."" This proceeding assures both the
debtor and creditor that the trustee is receiving the highest value for the
asset sold.
2. Making sales final.
Section 363(m) maximizes the value of the estate by making asset
sales final. This provision assures that purchasers of the debtor's
assets will not be dragged into litigation when creditors challenge the
terms of the sale. If the notice and hearing requirements of § 363(b)
are met, and the purchaser of the asset is acting in good faith, then
§ 363(m) precludes appeal of the sale by the estate's creditors.21 By
protecting sales from drawn-out litigation, § 363(m) encourages the
highest possible bid on assets of the estate.' If a potential purchaser
knows that § 363(m) will preclude subsequent challenges to the sale of
the asset, then the purchaser will not discount the purchase price in
anticipation of future litigation costs or the possibility of the sale
being declared invalid on appeal. This security incentivizes potential
purchasers to enter into dealings with the estate when they otherwise
would not. It also incentivizes higher bids.

19 See Commodity Futures Trading Commission v Weintraub, 471 US 343, 352 (1985). See
also Toibb v Radloff, 501 US 157, 163 (1991) (noting that an underlying purpose of the
Bankruptcy Code is to maximize the value of the estate); Resnick and Sommer, 2 Collier on
Bankruptcy 363.02 at 10-363 (cited in note 12).
20 In re Moore, 608 F3d 253, 263 (5th Cir 2010). See also In re the Lionel Corp,
722 F2d 1063, 1071 (2d Cir 1983) (holding that the judge must find a good business reason for a
§ 363(b) sale); Robert E. Ginsberg and Robert D. Martin, Ginsberg & Martin on Bankruptcy
§ 5.05 at 5-51-5-58 (Aspen 5th ed 2010).
21 See In re Trism, Inc, 328 F3d 1003,1006 (8th Cir 2003) ("[Slection 363(m) enhances the
value of the debtor's assets sold in bankruptcy. Section 363(m)'s finality also ... produc[es]
value for the estate and prevent[s] any modification or reversal of the bankruptcy court's
authorization of the sale from affecting the validity of the sale.") (citations omitted); Resnick
and Sommers, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 363.11 at 85-363 (cited in note 12).
22 See In re Abbotts Dairies of Pennsylvania,Inc, 788 F2d 143, 150 (3d Cir 1986) (noting
that one purpose of § 363(m) is to provide "finality of the bankruptcy court's judgments under
section 363(b)(1)"); In re Sax, 796 F2d 994, 998 (7th Cir 1986) ("Finality is important because it
minimizes the chance that purchasers will be dragged into endless rounds of litigation to
determine who has what rights in the property. Without the . . . finality provided by the stay
requirement, purchasers are likely to demand a steep discount for investing in the property."); In
re Exennium, Inc, 715 F2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir 1983).
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3. Not imposing judicial intervention.
The Bankruptcy Code does not impose the administrative costs
and court involvement of §363 on all sales of the estate's assets.'
Section 363(c) limits court involvement by not imposing judicial
intervention on sales that would have occurred during the "ordinary
course of business."" There is less need for judicial oversight when a
sale is made in the ordinary course of business. These kinds of sales
should already be getting the highest price available, so it would not
be useful to impose costly hearing and notice requirements." Thus, the
Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee discretion to handle these more
routine sales without requiring the bankruptcy court's involvement.
C. When § 363 Does Not Apply
Not all actions taken by the trustee fall within the purview of
§ 363." If § 363 does not apply to settlements of litigation claims, then
the bankruptcy court must look elsewhere for guidance to determine
whether there should be judicial oversight and, if so, what the extent
of judicial intervention should be. As noted earlier, the Code
comprises all substantive law governing bankruptcy proceedings.
When Code provisions are unclear, however, courts will also look to
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure for guidance. The Rules
establish the processes for the execution of the Code's substantive
provisions." They do not, however, add substantive rights to the
Bankruptcy Code." If the Rules conflict with the Bankruptcy Code,
the Bankruptcy Code trumps.

23 See Weintraub,471 US at 352 (stressing that "[tihe powers and duties of a bankruptcy
trustee are extensive").
24 See In re Selgar Realty Corp, 85 BR 235,240 (Bankr EDNY 1988) ("The purpose behind
the ordinary course of business rule in § 363 is to allow a business to continue its daily operations
without incurring the burden of obtaining court approval or notifying creditors for minor
transactions.").
25 See In re Miller Mining, Inc, 219 BR 219, 222-23 (Bankr ND Ohio 1998) (noting that
transactions made in the ordinary course of business would not benefit from court approval
because they do not expose creditors to a risk of unfair terms).
26 See, for example, 11 USC § 544(a)(1) (detailing the trustee's power to avoid transfers as
a hypothetical lien creditor); 11 USC § 548(a)(1) (providing the trustee's power to avoid
fraudulent transfers).
27 See FRBP 1001; In re Fesq,153 F3d 113,116 (3d Cir 1998).
28 28 USC § 2075.
29 See In re Pacific Atlantic Trading Co, 33 F3d 1064, 1066 (9th Cir 1994); Ginsberg and
Martin, Ginsberg & Martin on Bankruptcy § 1.05 at 1-95 (cited in note 20).
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Although the Code's substantive provisions do not address
settlements,a Rule 9019(a) does: "On motion by the trustee and after
notice and a hearing, the court may approve a compromise or
settlement." The discretionary language of Rule 9019(a) delegates to
the trustee the decision to seek court approval. Although
Rule 9019(a) is a rule of procedure only, many courts have
interpreted this provision to require court approval of settlements."
These courts often rely on the pre-Bankruptcy Code provisions of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,32 which had a substantive provision requiring
approval of settlements," and they fail to account for the changes
made to the Code's text.34 The Bankruptcy Code's legislative history
supports the position that less judicial intervention was intended:
"The bill removes many of the supervisory functions from the judge in
the first instance, transfers most of them to the trustee and to the
United States trustee, and involves the judge only when a dispute
arises."" Additionally, courts have recognized many other instances in
the Bankruptcy Code, besides the § 363(c) ordinary-course-ofbusiness exception, in which the trustee is granted wide discretion
without mandatory court intervention." Accordingly, many courts hold
30 See 11 USC § 323(b). See also In re Lee Way Holding Co, 120 BR 881, 890 (Bankr SD
Ohio 1990) ("The Code does not set forth any parameters with which a Trustee is to be guided
in evaluation or negotiation of a settlement.").
31 See, for example, Reynolds v Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 861 F2d 469, 473 (6th
Cir 1988) ("In bankruptcy proceedings, as distinguished from ordinary civil cases, any
compromise between the debtor and his creditors must be approved by the court as fair and
equitable."); In re The Leslie Fay Companies, 168 BR 294, 305 (Bankr SDNY 1994)
("Compromises may not be made in bankruptcy absent notice and a hearing and a court
order."); In re Pugh, 167 BR 251, 254 (Bankr MD Fla 1994); In re Rothwell, 159 BR 374, 379
(Bankr D Mass 1993).
32 30 Stat 544, superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub LNo 95-598,92 Stat 2549.
33 30 Stat at 553-54.
34 See In re Novak, 383 BR 660, 666-67 (Bankr WD Mich 2008) ("Congress' decision not
to incorporate former Section 27 into the Bankruptcy Code certainly suggests that the approval
of settlements is not to be among those activities under the Code where court intervention is still
required. The inference instead is that the trustee can now resolve disputes on his own."); In re
Telesphere Communications, Inc, 179 BR 544, 551 (Bankr ND Ill 1994) ("[Cases holding that
court approval is required] appear to be grounded in pre-Code decisions. . .. The Code itself
rejects this view of the role of the bankruptcy court; indeed, one of the express purposes of the
Code was to remove the bankruptcy judge from general estate administration.").
35 Bankruptcy Law Revision, HR Rep N6 95-595, 95th Cong, 1st Sess 4 (1977). As the
House Report explains, the Bankruptcy Code revisions were intended, in part, to place
additional limits on judicial intervention: "[The new Bankruptcy Code] will accomplish the
separation of judicial and administrative functions currently performed by the bankruptcy
judges. The judges will become passive arbiters of disputes .... [T]rustees will assume the
bankruptcy judges' current supervisory roles over the conduct of bankruptcy cases." Id at 107.
36 See, for example, In re Dawnwood Propertiesl78,209 F3d 114, 117 (2d Cir 2000)
(acknowledging that, under 11 USC § 323(b), "[u]ltimately, it was within the trustee's discretion
to pursue [claims against third parties], let them lie, or abandon them"); In re STN Enterprises,
779 F2d 901, 904 (2d Cir 1985) (noting that, "[u]nder [the. Bankruptcy Code], it is clear that a
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that judicial approval of settlements is not required by Rule 9019 and
apply a less demanding standard when approving a settlement of a
litigation claim under Rule 9019." This issue, however, is beyond the
scope of this Comment and does not speak to the threshold question
that has split the circuits: Does § 363 apply to settlements?
II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT: ARE SETILEMENTS "SALES" REQUIRING
§ 363 APPROVAL?

Courts disagree whether settlements are the equivalent of sales
of assets that require court approval under § 363(b). The Third Circuit
has held that settlements are sales and require § 363 analysis, because
a cause of action is an asset of the estate and a settlement is the means
by which the trustee sells the asset. The Fifth Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel have held that settlements
sometimes trigger § 363. Finally, the First Circuit has concluded that
settlements are fundamentally distinct from sales of assets and do not
implicate § 363.
A. The Third Circuit: Settlements Are Always Sales
In In re Martin," the Third Circuit analyzed a settlement as a sale
under § 363. The Martins had contracted to sell their house to the
Myerses, but after the contract was executed the Myerses refused to
pay." The parties initiated actions against each other for breach of
contract.The Martins later filed for bankruptcy, and the trustee settled
the dispute with the Myerses without court approval.o The Martins,
unaware of the settlement negotiations between the Myerses and the
trustee, had been granted an expedited trial date to bring the breach
of contract suit to court." The trustee realized that the estate could
trustee can initiate suit without court approval to avoid a preferential transfer of assets"); In re
V Savino Oil & Heating Co, 91 BR 655, 656-57 (Bankr EDNY 1988) (noting the discretion
granted to the trustee in pursuing avoidance actions under § 544).
37 See, for example, LeCompte v Sparks, 1997 WL 156488, *4 (ND Ill) (noting that "there
would be no need for court approval for a settlement agreement if the compromise did not
involve an action for which the Code requires court approval"); In re Novak, 383 BR at 667; In
re FortranPrinting,Inc, 297 BR 89,96 (Bankr ND Ohio 2003) (emphasizing that court approval
for settlements is "not [ ] necessary in every instance" and that the bankruptcy judge is "to stay
removed from the administration of the bankruptcy or reorganization case, and to become
involved only when there is a dispute about a proposed action"); In the Matter of Dalen, 259 BR
586, 603-04 (Bankr WD Mich 2001) ("Rule 9019(a) is nothing more than a free pass for the
trustee to secure declaratory relief regarding her personal exposure with respect to compromises
and settlements made by her on behalf of the estate."); In re Telesphere, 179 BR at 552.
38 91 F3d 389 (3d Cir 1996).
39 See id at 391.
4
See id.
41 See id at 392.
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receive more money if the Martins went to trial. Consequently, she did
not argue for the court to approve the settlement, and the judge
decided to wait for the trial's result. At trial, the Martins were awarded
money damages greater than the trustee's original settlement
agreement. The bankruptcy judge then denied the settlement
stipulation in order to allow the larger damages award to become part
of the estate. The issue on appeal was whether the bankruptcy judge
abused his discretion by denying the original settlement that the
trustee had proposed. The Third Circuit held that he had not abused
his discretion."
The Third Circuit explained that the proposed settlement was a
§ 363 sale: "The instant agreement compromised an asset of the debtors'
estate. ... [T]his act ventured beyond the domain of transactions that the
Martins encountered in the ordinary course of business prior to the filing
of bankruptcy, thereby implicating Section 363."" The court further
criticized the district court opinion for failing to analyze this issue under
the § 363 lens." Although it did not explicitly announce that all
settlements require § 363(b) analysis as sales, the Third Circuit's decision,
which relies heavily on the assumption that § 363 applies to settlements,
suggests this result: "The import of Section 363 is that a trustee is
prohibited from acting unilaterally."'
Following Martin, the Third Circuit decided Northview Motors,
Inc v Chrysler Motors Corp," affirming its position "that Section 363
of the Code is the substantive provision requiring court approval.""
The debtor, Northview Motors, had filed a civil action against Chrysler
asserting various claims, including tortious interference with contract
and breach of contract. The trustee settled the claims that it held
against Chrysler in exchange for both cash and the withdrawal of
various claims that Chrysler held against the estate. The debtor and a
secured creditor objected to the settlement, forcing the trustee to
abandon the claim, so the bankruptcy court never approved the
settlement agreement.4 After a counteroffer by Chrysler was rejected
by Northview and its secured creditor, Chrysler moved to enforce the
See Martin,91 F3d at 393,396.
Id at 394-95. The Third Circuit concluded that the cause of action was an asset of the
estate under 11 USC § 541(a)(1), see id at 395, which defines the estate as consisting of "all legal
or equitable interests of the debtor in property."
44 Id at 395 n 3.
42
43

45

Id at 395.

186 F3d 346 (3d Cir 1999).
Id at 351 n 4 (emphasis added).
48 See id at 347-48 (acknowledging that the bankruptcy court never approved the
proposed settlement agreement "[b]ecause of its order regarding abandonment" of the claim by
the trustee to the secured creditor).
46
47

1008

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:999

previous settlement agreement, which was never approved by the
bankruptcy court, between Chrysler and the trustee. The district court
enforced the settlement agreement, and Northview appealed to the
Third Circuit."
The Third Circuit held that the proposed settlement must meet
the § 363 requirements. It reasoned that "the Trustee's act of agreeing
to settle Northview's claims against Chrysler constituted a sale of that
claim... . Thus, the Bankruptcy Code contemplates notice, a hearing,
and bankruptcy court approval in this situation."so The Third Circuit
felt bound by Martin to hold that § 363 did require court approval of
the settlement.1 Because the lower court never approved the
agreement as required by § 363, the Third Circuit held that the
settlement was unenforceable.
The Third Circuit takes the position that a cause of action is an
asset of the estate under 11 USC § 541(a)(1), so that when the trustee
settles a cause of action, she is selling this asset. The transaction
therefore implicates § 363. Under this reasoning, a trustee must gain
court approval for every settlement under § 363.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel and the Fifth
Circuit: Some Settlements Are Sales

B.

1. The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel.
The Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel takes the position
that settlements are sometimes sales. In In re Mickey Thompson
EntertainmentGroup,Inc,52 the trustee sought approval of a fraudulent
transfer claim settlement under Rule 9019.53 A creditor objected to the
settlement amount because a third party sought to purchase the
claims for an amount higher than the proposed agreement. In
response to this offer, the trustee proposed an auction for the claims.
At the hearing, however, the bankruptcy court granted the motion to
approve the original settlement agreement proposed by the trustee.54

Id at 347-48.
Northview, 186 F3d at 350-51, citing In re Telesphere Communications,Inc, 179 BR 544,
552 n 7 (Bankr ND Ill 1994) ("The settlement of a cause of action held by the estate is plainly
the equivalent of a sale of that claim. There is no difference in the effect on the estate between
the sale of a claim ... to a third party and a settlement of the claim.").
51 Northview, 186 F3d at 351 n 4 (conceding that "Chrysler is correct that, as a matter of
law, Bankruptcy Rule 9019(a), a rule of procedure, cannot, by itself, create a substantive
requirement of judicial approval of the Trustee's settlement").
52 292 BR 415 (BAP 9th Cir 2003).
53 See id at 417.
54 See id at 418-19.
49

50
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On appeal, the court considered whether the bankruptcy court
abused its discretion by approving the original settlement." The court
held that the settlement was a sale of an asset because of the higher
offer, which implicated the substantive requirements of § 363." The
court, however, did not go so far as to say that the substantive
provisions of § 363 would be implicated in every settlement by the
estate. Instead, it left the standard for deciding when settlements
would implicate § 363 to the lower courts, directing only that they
consider whether the settlement would "draw a higher price through a
competitive process and be the proper subject of a section 363 sale.""
This result requires consideration of § 363 procedures for some
settlements, but provides little guidance for distinguishing which types
of settlements would require the formal procedures of § 363 and
which would be sufficiently handled under the trustee's discretion."
2. The Fifth Circuit.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in In re Moore" follows the
intermediate position of Mickey Thompson. This case concerned a
dispute between the debtor, James H. Moore III, and the debtor's
major creditor, the Cadle Company. Pre-petition, Moore owed the
Cadle Company $12.5 million, and the Cadle Company initiated a suit
against Moore alleging that Moore had hidden his personal assets
through various business mechanisms to avoid paying back the
antecedent debt. The Cadle Company asserted reverse veil-piercing
and fraudulent conveyance claims against Moore to reach the funds.
When Moore filed for bankruptcy, the litigation was stayed, and the
trustee, acting on behalf of the creditors, inherited the claim." The

55 In the bankruptcy court's view, the trustee had met his burden of proving that the
settlement was fair and equitable pursuant to the requirements of Rule 9019. Id at 419-20. This
standard is less stringent than the requirements of § 363(b) approval. Id at 420.
56 See Mickey Thompson, 292 BR at 421 ("We agree with the Third Circuit that the
disposition by way of 'compromise' of a claim that is an asset of the estate is the equivalent of a
sale ... which transaction simultaneously implicates the 'sale' provisions under section 363 ...
and the 'compromise' procedure of Rule 9019(a).").
57 Id at 421-22 (emphasizing that the implication of sale procedures would "depend[] upon
the dynamics of the particular situation"). But this gives only vague guidance to lower courts
looking to apply the Bankruptcy Code to these settlements. Determining whether a settlement
would be the proper subject of §363 requires a detailed analysis. See Part III.
58 See Mickey Thompson, 292 BR at 422 n 7 ("We are not suggesting that every
compromise ... must pass muster as a sale under section 363. We are sensitive to the different
considerations that come into play. But the inescapable fact in this case is that the label
'compromise' does not accurately characterize the transaction.").
59 608 F3d 253 (5th Cir 2010).
6
See id at 255-56. When a debtor enters bankruptcy, fraudulent transfer claims that
would be brought by a single creditor outside bankruptcy are instead brought by the trustee. See
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trustee was then charged to act on behalf of the general creditors in
bringing money or assets back to the estate that were improperly
hidden by the debtor Moore. The Cadle Company offered to purchase
the claim from the trustee so that it could pursue the litigation itself,
but the trustee refused. The trustee then settled the litigation claims
with Moore for $37,500, bringing that money into the estate for the
benefit of the creditors." Moore also agreed to waive a substantial
claim against the estate as part of the settlement, eliminating a
liability of the estate for the benefit of the creditors.
When the Cadle Company learned of the settlement, it offered
$50,000 for the claims and filed an objection to the settlement as a
violation of the trustee's obligation to maximize the value of assets
sold." If the trustee had accepted the Cadle Company's offer,
$50,000-as opposed to $37,500-would have flowed to the estate,
and the Cadle Company could have pursued the litigation claim
against Moore for its own benefit. Moore's claim, however, would still
be pending against the estate instead of being disposed of in the
settlement. The trustee refused the offer from the Cadle Company,
and the district court upheld the settlement between the trustee and
the defendants, stating in part that the trustee was legally unable to
sell the claims to a third party. 4 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that the district court had abused its discretion.
The Fifth Circuit held that the proposed settlement constituted a
sale and implicated § 363. The court reasoned that the higher offer by
the Cadle Company required the court to use §363's formal
procedures of notice and a hearing.6 The Fifth Circuit rejected the
trustee's argument that, because the settlement constituted a mutual
release of claims, it was not a § 363 sale.
Moore aligns with Mickey Thompson and stands for the

proposition that settlements of causes of action may sometimes be sales
and therefore require consideration of whether the § 363 requirements
apply." Neither court, however, sufficiently explains how to distinguish
between settlements that trigger § 363 and those that do not.
11 USC §544(b) (providing trustees with the power to avoid fraudulent transfers for the
interests of creditors).
61 See Moore, 608 F3d at 256.
62 See id at 265.
63 See id at 256.
6
See id at 256-57.
65 See Moore, 608 F3d at 263-65, quoting Mickey Thompson, 292 BR at 422
("[E]ntertaining overbids often triggers a bidding sequence that may lead to a much higher
price.").
See Moore, 608 F3d at 266 ("In the event an auction is held and the trustee selects
6
defendants' offer, the bankruptcy court must assess the transaction ... under § 363. Procedures
under that rule would not be invoked, however, were the trustee to accept Cadle's bid.").
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The First Circuit: Settlements Are Never Sales

C.

In In re Healthco International,Inc," the First Circuit held that
settlements are never sales. There, the trustee had a fraudulent
transfer claim and a state law tort claim. The trustee proposed a
settlement: the estate would drop its claims in return for both
monetary compensation and the waiver of several claims that the
third party had against the estate. The court approved the settlement
under Rule 9019 with only a slight modification. Several codefendants
objected to the settlement and one appealed. The trustee looked to
have the appeal dismissed on the ground that the settlement was a
§ 363 sale. Though § 363(b)'s notice and hearing requirements had
been met, and the settlement was entered into in good faith, the
trustee argued that § 363(m)-which precludes the appeal of sales
meeting the above conditions-should apply in this case." The court
disagreed.
The First Circuit gave three reasons why § 363 was inapplicable.
First, "[bly its very nature a settlement resolves adversarial claims prior
to their definitive determination by the court. In contrast, a 'sale' effects
a '[t]ransfer of ["the title . . . "] [to] property for [a] consideration."' 6 In

the First Circuit's view, a settlement was a fundamentally different
transaction from a sale of an asset. Because of the differences between
a settlement and a sale, applying § 363 to settlements was not a logical
step. Second, the court found the purpose of the good faith protection
of § 363(m), which is to encourage the highest bids possible for assets,
inapplicable to the settlement. The Bank Group "in no sense qualified
as an outside bidder eligible for the extraordinary 'finality' guaranties
afforded by section 363(m).""o The fact that § 363(m) added no value to
these settlements -unlike the typical sale -was further proof that § 363
was inapplicable. Third, the court used the fact that Rule 9019 lacked a
substantive analogue requiring the court to approve settlements as
evidence that § 363 was inapplicable." Because the Rules recognize the
distinction between sales and settlements, § 363 should not be read to
ignore this distinction.72 The court then affirmed the approval of the
settlement under Rule 9019.

136 F3d 45 (1st Cir 1998).
See id at 47-49.
69 Id at 49 (alterations in original) (citation omitted).
70 Id.
71 See Healthco, 136 F3d at 49-50.
72 This distinction is highlighted by the existence of Rule 6004, which is the procedural rule
for approving § 363 sales. While Rule 6004 has its substantive analogue in § 363, Rule 9019 does
not. This is a distinction that would be ignored if § 363 were to apply to all settlements.
67

68
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By holding that a settlement is never a sale for the purposes of
§ 363, the First Circuit placed itself in the minority. Importantly, the
case highlights the potential problems of mapping §363
considerations on to settlements. The court recognized that the
analogy between sale and settlement does not always hold true and
could lead to unintended consequences, such as granting good faith
protection when none is needed or requiring a court to approve a
settlement when no such approval is required.

As it stands, the lower courts are divided. The Third Circuit holds
that settlements are always sales, while the Fifth Circuit and Ninth
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel hold that settlements can be sales
but left little guidance for lower courts to determine when § 363
applies. Finally, the First Circuit holds that settlements are not sales
and that § 363 does not apply.
III. THE NONBANKRUPTCY BASELINE PROVIDES A SOLUTION

This Comment rejects both the position of the Third Circuit (that
settlements are always sales) and the position of the First Circuit (that
settlements are never sales). Instead, this Comment adopts the
intermediate position of the Fifth Circuit and the Ninth Circuit
Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (that settlements can sometimes be
sales), because this position aligns with the nonbankruptcy baseline.
To determine the nonbankruptcy baseline, a court must first identify
the law outside bankruptcy and then ask whether a change in this
background rule is justified by the purposes of bankruptcy law. This
Part first shows that the nonbankruptcy baseline framework is well
established in bankruptcy and identifies the nonbankruptcy rule with
regard to settlements and sales. It then argues that the Third and First
Circuits' positions would result in consequences contrary to the text
and purposes of § 363.
A. Analysis of the Bankruptcy Code Should Begin with the
Nonbankruptcy Baseline
Outside bankruptcy, a holder of a litigation claim may settle that
claim without formal court procedures akin to those required by § 363
of the Bankruptcy Code. The nonbankruptcy rule, however, should be
modified, and the protections of § 363 imposed in certain cases that
would benefit from these protections. But there should be a change
from the background rule only when a specific bankruptcy purpose
requires the change. The framework suggested below is based on
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identifying distinctions between transactions that do not require a
change in this nonbankruptcy rule to maximize the value of the estate
and those that do require, or would benefit from, § 363.
1. The nonbankruptcy baseline is well established in case law
and the academic literature.
Identifying the nonbankruptcy rule and the purposes for changing
this rule in bankruptcy is an intuitive approach favored by the tradition
of case law and academic literature. In Butner v United States," the
Supreme Court first recognized the general principle that bankruptcy
law should mirror state law unless there is a significant justification for
a departure. The Court stressed that, "[u]nless some federal interest
requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests should
be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in
a bankruptcy proceeding."', This general principle-that a change from
state law is unwarranted unless a specific problem associated with
bankruptcy requires a change-has also been recognized by the
academic literature." One scholar notes that "[a] rule change unrelated
to the goals of bankruptcy creates incentives for particular holders of
rights in assets to resort to bankruptcy in order to gain for themselves
the advantages of that rule change.""
Bankruptcy courts have applied the nonbankruptcy framework
when determining whether § 363 should apply in other contexts,
including the payment of "break-up fees." To incentivize bidders to bid
on an asset from the estate, debtors often agree to pay fees to potential
purchasers to protect them against the risk of a higher bid that causes
the bidder's potential agreement to fall through." When bankruptcy
courts have to determine what standard of review to apply to the
payment of break-up fees, they begin with state law. Under the
applicable state law outside bankruptcy, a court reviews payments of
break-up fees in the merger and acquisitions context under the business

440 US 48 (1979).
Id at 55.
See Douglas G. Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy 5 (Foundation 5th ed 2010) ("Butner thus
allows us to draw from a complicated statute a single organizing principle. Knowing the outcome
under nonbankruptcy law can go a long way toward understanding the problem in bankruptcy.");
Juliet M. Moringiello, A Tale of Two Codes: Examining § 522(f) of the Bankruptcy Code, § 9-103
of the Uniform Commercial Code and the ProperRole of State Law in Bankruptcy, 79 Wash U L
Q 863,911 (2001).
76 Jackson, Logic and Limits at 33 (cited in note 8). See also Thomas H. Jackson,
TranslatingAssets and Liabilitiesto the Bankruptcy Forum,14 J Legal Stud 73, 89 (1985).
77 See In re IntegratedResources Inc, 135 BR 746, 750 (Bankr SDNY 1992) (noting some
possible reimbursements that a seller would make as part of a break-up fee agreement).
73

74
75
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judgment rule." The bankruptcy courts, therefore, must determine
whether there is a justification warranting deviation from the business
judgment rule when these payments are made during bankruptcy. Some
courts have held that the nonbankruptcy standard of reviewing breakup fees under the business judgment rule is sufficient." Other courts,
however, have found a deviation from the nonbankruptcy baseline
appropriate and impose a more stringent standard of review. These
courts justify the departure on the grounds that break-up fees present a
risk to creditors as an "unwarranted expense upon the Debtor's
estate.". The cases and literature reveal a consistent approach to
interpreting ambiguities in the Bankruptcy Code: courts will apply the
nonbankruptcy baseline unless there is a strong interest that warrants a
deviation."

2. The nonbankruptcy baseline for settlements and sales.
Section 363 is a response to a particular problem that a debtor
faces in bankruptcy that is not present outside bankruptcy. When a
debtor enters bankruptcy, selling assets of the estate can be difficult
because purchasers are hesitant to deal with an insolvent party and
may fear the prolonged litigation that could accompany the purchase.2
Furthermore, because multiple creditors now have an interest in
seeing the asset obtain the highest value for the estate, it may be
desirable to set up a formal auction procedure. These concerns,
however, are not present in a normal asset sale outside bankruptcy.
Instead, it is only inside bankruptcy that these problems occur. Section
78 See, for example, Cottle v Storer Communication, Inc, 849 F2d 570,578-79 (11th Cir 1988).

79 See, for example, In re 995 Fifth Avenue Associates, LP, 96 BR 24, 28 (Bankr SDNY
1989) (holding that the nonbankruptcy standards for reviewing break-up fees were applicable in
the bankruptcy context); In re Integrated Resources Inc, 147 BR 650,656 (SDNY 1992).
8
In re Hupp Industries Inc, 140 BR 191, 195-96 (Bankr ND Ohio 1992) ("In the
bankruptcy context, however, bidding incentives ... are carefully scrutinized in § 363(b) asset
sales to insure that the debtor's estate is not unduly burdened and that the relative rights of the
parties in interest are protected."). See also In the Matter of Tiara Motorcoach Corp,212 BR 133,
137 (Bankr ND Ind 1997) ("[The break-up fee was part of a] sale pursuant to § 363 ... and the
business judgment of the debtor should not be solely relied upon.").
81 See, for example, In re S.N.A. Nut Co, 186 BR 98,104 (Bankr ND Ill 1995) (holding that
a deviation from the business judgment rule is necessary because "bidders in a § 363 asset sale
enjoy several benefits not available to bidders operating outside of the Code"). See also Paul B.
Lackey, An Empirical Survey and Proposed Bankruptcy Code Section Concerning the Propriety
of Bidding Incentives in a Bankruptcy Sale of Assets, 93 Colum L Rev 720, 737-38 (1993)
(comparing the purposes that bidding incentives serve in bankruptcy asset sales with the mergerand-acquisition context to argue for a change in how bidding incentives like break-up fees are
analyzed under the Bankruptcy Code); Bruce A. Markell, The Case against Breakup Fees in
Bankruptcy,66 Am Bankr L J 349,377 (1992) (noting that the nonbankruptcy standard does not
adequately account for benefits that the Bankruptcy Code already provides to asset sales).
82 See text accompanying notes 21-22.
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363 and its formal procedures respond to these specific problems:'
"[B]ankruptcy takes nonbankruptcy rights as it finds them. Only the
procedures change, and these change only to solve the particular
problems bankruptcy is designed to address."8 To properly determine
how to treat settlements, it is important to identify the qualities of the
transaction that require a change from the nonbankruptcy rule and
those that do not. When deciding whether to analyze a settlement
under § 363, a bankruptcy court should identify the settlement's
particular qualities and make the changes from the background rule
only when the protections of § 363 would serve the purpose that they
were intended to serve.
Applying the Butner principle to the current split provides a
resolution true to the Code's underlying goals. The background rule
that applies when the debtor sells an asset is that a debtor would be
able to sell the claim without cause for concern outside bankruptcy.
When a debtor enters bankruptcy, however, there is sometimes ample
reason to change the background rule to serve the interests of the
creditors and the estate. For example, a sale of an asset outside the
ordinary course of business presents a risk to creditors that the estate
is not receiving fair value, while a sale within the ordinary course of
business should not present as strong of a risk. The Code recognizes
this difference, and the protections of § 363 apply only to sales outside
the ordinary course of business. For settlements, the background
nonbankruptcy rule is that a debtor would be able to unilaterally
settle a claim against a third party. The settling of claims inside
bankruptcy, however, does not necessarily require a change in the
background rule in all circumstances. In fact, a change in the
background rule for some settlements would result in harm to the
estate by increasing litigation costs and reducing the value of the
settlement. This Comment uses the Butner principle to show when
bankruptcy law should deviate from the nonbankruptcy baseline.
The Third Circuit's Position That All Settlements Require § 363
Analysis Should Be Rejected

B.

This Part rejects the Third Circuit's holding that all settlements
require court approval under § 363, because it unnecessarily changes
the nonbankruptcy baseline rule in some cases. Applying § 363 to all
settlements would impose costs on the bankruptcy process by
mandating judicial intervention and restricting the trustee's discretion.

83
8

See Part I.B.
See Baird, Elements of Bankruptcy at 5 (cited in note 75).
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These costs would not be offset by any gain to the estate, because the
protections of § 363 do not increase the value of some settlements.
1. The costs of increased court involvement.
Treating all settlements as sales under § 363(b) would require all
settlements to get court approval. This would slow down the process
of administering the estate and increase administrative costs. By
requiring settlements of miniscule amounts to gain court approval
under § 363, the administrative costs could outstrip the settlement
amount.
Moreover, recent changes to the Code and the Rules indicate a
move away from requiring court approval of settlements. First, when it
revised the Code, Congress removed the requirement in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 that settlements be reviewed by the court.
Bankruptcy courts should respect congressional action. As the
Supreme Court has said, "It is generally presumed that Congress acts
intentionally and purposely when it includes particular language in
one section of a statute but omits it in another."" Second, the
discretionary language of Rule 9019 further supports Congress's
intent to leave discretion to the trustee. It notes that "the use of 'may'
in the rule as opposed to 'shall' creates ambiguity at the very least,
especially in light of ... Congress' express decision to remove the

court from case administration."m This suggests that Congress
intended to move away from requiring court approval of settlements."
85 See S.N.A. Nut, 186 BR at 105-06 (noting the costs of § 363(b) sales and observing that
one purpose of providing bidders with break-up fees is to compensate parties for the expenses in
participating in the sale). See also In the Matter of Dalen, 259 BR 586, 599 n 18 (Bankr WD Mich
2001) ("It is unlikely that Congress intended the bankruptcy courts to micro-manage trustee
settlements and the court is unwilling to read into Rule 9019(a) an ordinary course exception to
trustee settlements."); In re Novak, 383 BR 660, 668-69 (Bankr WD Mich 2008):

[I]nterpreting Rule 9019(a) as requiring approval without some type of ordinary course
exception could easily lead to the incongruous situation of a trustee being empowered to
independently sell under Section 363(c) a very expensive item .. . yet having to run back to
court to approve the settlement of even the most inconsequential of warranty claims arising
from the very same sale.
86
30 Stat 544, superseded by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub L No 95-598,92 Stat 2549.
87 City of Chicago v Environmental Defense Fund, 511 US 328, 338 (1994) (quotation
marks omitted). See also BFP v Resolution Trust Corp, 511 US 531, 549-55 (1994) (Souter
dissenting).
88 Novak, 383 BR at 668.
89 See id at 664-65. For an alternative view, see Reynaldo Anaya Valencia, The Sanctity of
Settlements and the Significance of CourtApproval DiscerningClarityfrom Bankruptcy Rule 9019,
78 Or L Rev 425, 449-50 (1999) (arguing that compliance with Rule 9019 is mandatory for all
settlements). Reynaldo Valencia notes that, under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, court approval was
required of all settlement agreements but that, "[flor some unexplainable reason," the Code had
not included a substantive provision requiring court approval of settlements. Id at 449. The
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2. Harm to the estate's bargaining power.
Requiring a trustee to come to court and hold a § 363 hearing
forces the trustee to disclose publicly information about the estate.
The availability of this information may affect how future creditors of
the estate bargain with the trustee or negotiate future settlements.o If
a trustee must disclose the estate's prospects before any settlement
agreement can be confirmed, then the current defendant and future
parties would have access to this information and would be in a better
position to negotiate with the estate. With this information available
to the public, parties might decide to litigate a claim that they would
otherwise settle, thus forcing the estate to incur these costs. This would
counteract § 363's purpose of gaining the highest value possible for
each claim.
The potential for harm to the estate's bargaining power has been
acknowledged in the context of Rule 9019. Courts have noted that one
benefit of the Rule's discretionary nature allows the trustee to decide
not to seek court approval if doing so might harm the estate's
bargaining position: "If [the] Trustee is truly concerned about
disclosure, then she should withdraw her Rule 9019(a) motion and
rely instead upon her own experience as to whether the settlement
passes muster or not."" If § 363 applied to all settlements, then this
advantage would be lost, as the trustee would have to come to court to
gain approval, thus defeating § 363's purpose.
3. The § 363(m) finality provision does not apply to settlements.
Sales under § 363 enjoy the protections of § 363(m), which grants
finality of sales to good faith purchasers. This is done to grant
legitimacy to the estate and encourage bidders by eliminating the
threat that future litigation would arise from the purchase. The
omission, however, may be explained by the Bankruptcy Code's preference for limiting court
involvement and is consistent with the discretionary language of Rule 9019 itself. Further, courts
have been hesitant to attribute no meaning to congressional changes to statutory language. See
TRW Inc vAndrews,534 US 19,31 (2001) ("It is a cardinal principle of statutory construction that a
statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can be prevented, no clause, sentence, or
word shall be superfluous, void, or insignificant.") (quotation marks omitted); In re Reasonover,
236 BR 219,228 & n 8 (Bankr ED Va 1999) (noting that the Bankruptcy Code is complicated and
that drafting errors have happened but-absent clear errors-"[w]hen Congress speaks, the court
must assume that it does so for a purpose").
90 See Brad B. Erens and Kelly M. Neff, Confidentiality in Chapter 11, 22 Emory Bankr
Dev J 47, 86-90 (2006) (arguing that not all settlements should require court approval because
mandatory court approval would impose costs on the debtor by forcing public disclosures).
91 Novak, 383 BR at 676.
92 See In re Mark Bell FurnitureWarehouse, Inc, 992 F2d 7, 8 (1st Cir 1993) (noting that
§ 363(m) good faith protection is beneficial because "finality and reliability of judicial sales
enhance the value of assets sold in bankruptcy"). See also text accompanying notes 21-22.
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purpose of § 363(m) has been recognized to give "finality to
judgments by protecting good faith purchasers, the innocent third
parties who rely on the finality of bankruptcy judgments in making
their offers and bids."' This benefit of § 363 is unnecessary in the
context of settlements, however, because the defendant is not debating
whether it should enter into business with the debtor. With the threat
of costly litigation already present, a potential defendant needs no
further incentive to enter into negotiations with the debtor. In this
sense, it is not a typical "purchaser" for the purposes of § 363(m).
Further, it is unclear how the bankruptcy court would determine
if a settling defendant was a "good faith purchaser" as required by
§ 363(m)." When deciding whether a purchaser acted in good faith,
courts have looked at "the integrity of his conduct in the course of the
sale proceedings," finding bad faith when there is "fraud, collusion
between the purchaser and other bidders or the trustee, or an attempt
to take grossly unfair advantage of other bidders."" It would be
difficult to map this analysis on to the negotiations between a trustee
and a settling defendant. Unlike a § 363(b) auction, where there is a
bidding process, the defendant and a trustee will come to mutually
agreeable terms, typically on their own. The interests of other bidders
may not be present, and it would be hard to determine when hard
bargaining or a quick agreement between the trustee and the
defendant would constitute "bad faith" for the purposes of this
provision. This element of § 363 might result in courts considering all
settling defendants "good faith purchasers," which would preclude the
appeal of all settlement agreements. This would essentially read the
"good faith" requirement out of § 363 when applied to settlements.
Alternatively, whether a settling defendant acted in good faith could
be contested in front of the bankruptcy court. If this were the case, then
the negotiations between a trustee and a settling defendant will be
impacted by efforts to look more like a good faith purchase. Defendants
will be concerned with justifying the agreement in court as one made in
"good faith," and because of this added cost, defendants will be more
likely to litigate. Both of these results would alter settlement negotiations,
revealing the problems of applying § 363 to settlements. Accordingly, no
court has applied the good faith protections to settlements of a debtor's
cause of action against a third party."

See In re Motors LiquidationCo,430 BR 65,79 n 8 (Bankr SDNY 2010).
11 USC § 363 (emphasis added).
95 In reAbbotts Dairiesof Pennsylvania,Inc, 788 F2d 143,147 (3d Cir 1986).
96 See Healthco, 136 F3d at 49 (noting the inapplicability of § 363(m) protections to
settlements).
93

94
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4. Restricting the discretion of the trustee.
Settlements examined under Rule 9019 require a showing that the
proposed agreement is fair and equitable, while settlements examined
under § 363 require the trustee to show a sound business judgment and
that the sale maximizes the value of the estate. The Rule 9019 standard
is less rigorous than the § 363 standard, as shown in Moore." Unlike in
Moore, however, there may be many circumstances in which a trustee
would like to settle a claim, but fear of having the settlement voided if
the more rigorous § 363 standards were to apply will cause the trustee
to wait unnecessarily to see if there will be any overbids. Accordingly, to
maximize the value of the estate, a trustee will have to adjust her
priorities when negotiating settlements to accord with the § 363
requirements. This may potentially eliminate or delay some settlement
agreements that would have passed muster had § 363 been inapplicable.
C. The First Circuit's Position That Settlements Never Require § 363
Analysis Should Be Rejected
The First Circuit held that settlements are not the equivalent of
sales and therefore do not trigger § 363 analysis. This position
overlooks a class of settlements that could benefit from the bidding
procedures of § 363. That is, some causes of action belonging to the
estate may be sold to a third party." When there are multiple potential
purchasers for the claim, the § 363 protections are appropriate
because of their value-maximizing function. First, by setting up the
bidding process in a single forum, the formal sales procedures help the
trustee easily value various bids on the litigation claim. Second, the
§ 363(m) finality provisions induce third parties who would normally
not deal with an estate in bankruptcy to bid on the asset, which
increases the value brought to the estate.n A blanket rule rejecting
See Moore, 608 F3d at 263.
See id at 264 (noting that a trustee would not need to consider overbids when relying
solely on Rule 9019 for approval but would have to consider these higher offers under § 363).
99 See text accompanying note 110.
1oo Section 363 has other provisions that increase the sale price for assets of the estate.
Section 363(f) permits the sale of property "free and clear of any interest in such property of an
entity other than the estate." This provision is inapplicable to settlements, however, as the assetthat is, the cause of action-is unencumbered by any interest other than that of the holder of the
claim, the estate. For a discussion of what constitutes an "interest in property" that is removed
when the property is sold free and clear under § 363(f), see In re Trans World Airlines, Inc,
322 F3d 283, 288-90 (3d Cir 2003). Section 363(k) also increases the sales price by allowing a
secured creditor to bid the face value of its secured claims. See In re SubMicron Systems Corp,
432 F3d 448,459 (3d Cir 2006). This process is known as "credit bidding," and it ensures that the
secured creditor is protected because he can bid up to the value of his claim and guarantee that,
if the asset is sold, he will still be paid in full or receive the asset. Both of these provisions are
97

98
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§ 363 analysis for all settlements fails to account for these features and
will limit the estate's ability to maximize the value of its assets.
IV. THE NONBANKRUPTCY BASELINE FRAMEWORK
Always or never requiring the application of § 363 to settlements
results in outcomes inconsistent with § 363's purposes. This Comment
therefore adopts the intermediate approach that settlements should
sometimes be examined under § 363. Courts currently taking this
position, however, fail to articulate a framework for determining when
§ 363 should apply. This Part proposes a framework in which courts
deviate from the nonbankruptcy treatment of settlements -which
requires no court review-only when doing so would serve §363's
intended purpose. First, the court should consider the threshold issue
of whether the claim is alienable outside bankruptcy. If so, the court
should then balance various factors, including whether the terms of
the settlement agreement include a mutual release of claims, the
consequences of making the terms of the settlement public, and
whether there are multiple potential purchasers of the claim.
A. Threshold Question: Is the Cause of Action Alienable or
Assignable outside Bankruptcy?
The first step is a threshold determination: if the claim is
inalienable outside bankruptcy, then it should not trigger § 363. The
provisions of §363 correct for the difficulty of selling an asset in
bankruptcy when purchasers would otherwise be scared off by the
debtor's insolvency and potential bidders need to be located.
Inalienable claims require the holder of the claim to negotiate directly
with the trustee. The purposes underlying § 363 are therefore
inapplicable to inalienable claims, and there is no need to deviate
from the nonbankruptcy baseline rule allowing the cause of action to
be settled without court intervention.
There are certain causes of actions, such as personal injury
lawsuit claims, that are inalienable outside bankruptcy.o' At common
law, causes of action were held to be inalienable based on whether the
cause of action was descendible; if a claim did not survive the death of
the holder, then it was not assignable."' But courts retained the ability
to deem a cause of action inalienable based on public policy,
inapplicable to settlements and are evidence of the incongruity of the protections of § 363 and
settlement agreements.
101 See Marc J. Shukaitis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort Claims, 16 J Legal Stud 329,
330-33 (1987).
102 See State Mutual Life Assurance Co of America v Deer Creek Park, 612 F2d 259, 265
(6th Cir 1979) (noting that tort actions were traditionally inalienable at common law).
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regardless of the claim's ability to survive the holder.' Additionally,
some states codify the common law tradition by prohibiting the sale of
certain claims by statute." This state-law distinction has not been lost
on bankruptcy courts.' For example, the distinction between alienable
and inalienable claims was noted when deciding what constitutes
property of the estate at the commencement of a bankruptcy
proceeding: "The most significant interest which may not be assigned
or transferred is a cause of action for personal injury. The proscription
on the aliening of personal injury actions existed at common law
and ... personal injury actions are exempt from creditor process." "
The alienability of the cause of action was identified by the Fifth
Circuit in In re Moore, when it reviewed the lower court's approval of
a settlement without § 363 procedures.o
There are differences from state to state over which causes of
action are alienable." The trustee should not gain a right that was
unavailable to the debtor outside bankruptcy law when there is no
justification for the departure from the nonbankruptcy baseline.
Therefore, the trustee should not gain the ability to make inalienable
claims alienable just because of the happenstance of bankruptcy.
Inalienable claims do not require the protections of § 363's notice and
hearing requirements, because there is no need to encourage the
defendant to deal with the debtor. Unlike a sale, in which a purchaser
has a choice to buy from the debtor but may be hesitant to do so
because of the seller's insolvency, a defendant already has the
incentive to settle because he is faced with the costs of future
litigation. The justifications for the departures from nonbankruptcy
103 See, for example, Joos v Drillock, 338 NW2d 736, 739 (Mich App 1983) (holding that a
legal malpractice claim was nontransferable "[iln view of the personal nature of the attorneyclient relationship" and attendant public policy considerations).
104 See, for example, NY Gen Oblig Law § 13-101 (McKinney) (providing that any cause of
action is transferable subject to three limitations).
105 See, for example, In re Schauer, 835 F2d 1222, 1225 (8th Cir 1987) ("Sections 363(b)(1)
and 704 do not [ ] authorize the trustee to sell property contrary to the restrictions imposed by
state and contract law. These sections ... give the trustee the authority to sell or dispose of
property if the debtors would have had the same right under state law."); Integrated Solutions,
Inc v Service Support Specialties, Inc, 124 F3d 487, 494 (3d Cir 1997).
106 In re Sheets, 69 BR 542, 543 n 4 (Bankr WDNY 1987) (citation omitted). See also In re
Mucelli, 21 BR 601, 603 (Bankr SDNY 1982) (noting that "an assignment or transfer of a
personal injury is prohibited").
107 Moore, 608 F3d at 257-58.
10
A good example is a legal malpractice claim. Compare Joos,338 NW2d at 739 (holding a
legal malpractice claim inalienable); Goodley v Wank & Wank, Inc, 133 Cal Rptr 83, 87 (Cal
App 1976) ("It is the unique quality of legal services .. . that invoke public policy considerations
in our conclusion that malpractice claims should not be subject to assignment."), with Greevy v
Becker, Isserlis, Sullivan & Kurtz, 658 NYS2d 693, 694 (NY App 1997) (holding that legal
malpractice claims are assignable).
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rules are not present with these claims. When there is no justification
to depart from the nonbankruptcy laws, state law should apply."
Moreover, a settlement of an inalienable claim, by nature, has only
one potential "bidder." This renders the notification provisions of § 363
useless for inducing a higher price for the settlement. There can be no
auction with only one available bidder. Analysis under §363 would, in
fact, lower the settlement amount because of the increased cost to the
settling parties of the court hearing, which includes the risk of the court's
rejecting the settlement. In these situations, the trustee should be
permitted to settle the case on her own, outside § 363's requirements.
Many states, however, hold that litigation claims are alienable as a
general rule."o Even where a cause of action is freely assignable and
alienable, there are still reasons why § 363's analysis would be
inappropriate. For instance, if there is only one potential purchaser of
the asset, and that potential purchaser is a creditor of the estate, then
the formal sale requirements of § 363 are unnecessary because there is
no need for an auction to attract additional bidders. Therefore, a claim
can be alienable and still be a poor fit for § 363. On the other hand, a
cause of action with multiple potential purchasers would benefit from
§ 363's auction procedures. An initial finding of alienability thus does
not end the analysis, nor does it cut one way or the other. The suggested
framework for the classification of settlements requires a balancing of
the next three factors.
Does the Settlement Agreement Include a Mutual Release
of Claims?
Section 363 treatment should be disfavored when the settlement
agreement involves a mutual release of claims."' This factor should be
weighed the most heavily when characterizing the settlement, because
deviating from the nonbankruptcy rule and applying § 363 would
B.

109 See Jackson, Logic and Limits at 33 (cited in note 8) (arguing that a "rule change
unrelated to the goals of bankruptcy creates incentives for particular holders of rights in assets to
resort to bankruptcy in order to gain for themselves the advantages of that rule change"); Barry
E. Adler, Douglas G. Baird, and Thomas H. Jackson, Cases, Problems and Materials on
Bankruptcy 30 (Foundation 4th ed 2007) ("The most sensible approach to interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code is usually one that begins by assuming that Congress intended to vindicate the
policy in question with as little disturbance as possible to the nonbankruptcy baseline."). See also
Part III.A.
110 See Smith v Endicott-Johnson Corp, 192 NYS 121, 123 (NY App 1921) ("The general
rule is that all rights of action in tort, which do not apply to the person strictly, but are for injury
to one's property or estate, are assignable. A right of action for the wrongful conversion of
personal property is assignable.") (citation omitted).
111 See, for example, Moore, 608 F3d at 265 (discussing a mutual release of claims but then
deciding to apply § 363 to a settlement).
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override the trustee's discretion, and the trustee is in the best position
to value the assets and liabilities of the estate. By invoking § 363, the
trustee's knowledge of the estate is ignored in favor of a bidding war
designed to gain the highest possible cash offering for the asset. The
highest cash offering may not, however, provide the best result for the
estate because it fails to account for the trustee's valuation of the
release of the claim against the estate. For instance, imagine a case in
which $100 is the highest bid that the trustee can receive for a cause of
action, but that there is a settlement offer of $50 accompanied by a
release of a claim against the estate that is potentially worth anywhere
from $45 to $75, depending on the merits of the claim against the
estate. The trustee is in a better position than the bankruptcy judge to
assess litigation strategies and evaluate the strength of the pending
claim and thus the value of obtaining a release of that claim.
Therefore, if she has reason to believe that the claim against the estate
is worth only $45, then she can reject the offer. But, if the claim
against the estate is more likely to be worth $75, then she can accept
the $50 settlement for both claims. Applying § 363 to these settlements
would be harmful because it would take this decision out of the
trustee's discretion.
Applying § 363 to these agreements would add unnecessary
layers of speculation when determining what value to accord the
agreement. When a trustee settles a claim against a third party, the
trustee is measuring the likelihood of success in the litigation, the cost
of the litigation, and the amount of damages potentially gained. When
it settles a litigation claim against the estate, the trustee is making a
similar calculation of those uncertainties to determine the potential
liability to the estate. By negotiating a release of litigation claims
against the estate, the trustee is eliminating a potential liability of the
estate and therefore increasing the pool left for creditors. If § 363 is
applied to these agreements, then the bankruptcy court will either fail
to account for the value of the release of claims against the estate or
determine the value of the claim itself. Either way, analyzing a mutual
release of claims under § 363 fails to account for the trustee's analysis
of the liability avoided through the settlement. If not convinced by the
trustee that the mutual release is a good use of assets under § 363,
then the court will favor a creditor's absolute bid over the potential
value of the cause of action by itself.
The normal § 363 overbid cases include multiple cash bids on one
asset. In a settlement agreement for the mutual release of claims,
however, the trustee is best positioned to consider the contingent legal
claim against the estate because he alone will have to defend the suit.
Ignoring the trustee's knowledge of the claim may produce a result
that is inefficient in the aggregate. The court in Mickey Thompson

1024

The University of Chicago Law Review

[78:999

suggested that the mutual release of claims would take a settlement
out of the definition of sale under § 363,"2 but the Fifth Circuit in
Moore rejected this distinction. 13 The court in Mickey Thompson has
the better of this argument; the more personal the agreement between
the individual defendant and the estate, the more it looks like the
traditional settlement agreement. These agreements would benefit
from the trustee's expertise and closeness to the dispute and do not
need the § 363 sale protections.
Additionally, many bankruptcy courts have required the review of
settlements that include mutual releases of claims under Rule 9019
instead of § 363."' The circuit courts, however, have failed to give this
consideration its proper weight when classifying settlements. Courts
understand that the urgency of settlements requires different treatment
from sales."' Speed is essential for the formulation of a plan of
reorganization in Chapter 11, and in some cases settlements are the first
step toward getting a plan formed or approved."' Further, in In re

See Mickey Thompson, 292 BR at 421.
See Moore, 608 F3d at 265-66. The court identified the contingent nature of the indemnity
claim as reason to find it unimportant to the classification of the settlement. It explained,
"Brunswick's indemnity claim is a contingent claim that would be triggered only if the reverse veilpiercing claims against it were to prevail." Id at 265. This court's discounting of the mutual release
of litigation claims, however, was informed by the court's own judgment of the value of the claim:
"Bankruptcy courts should not allow defendants to settle estate claims at a discount and avoid
§ 363 scrutiny by filing large, frivolous claims against the estate." Id. The court did not believe that
the indemnity claim was worth much to the estate, stating that "[e]ven if Brunswick's indemnity
claim is legally viable, its value would be limited to Brunswick's maximum exposure in the alter-ego
action. No one has ever valued that action at $12 million; Cadle's most optimistic estimates value it
at no more than $2 million." Id at 265 n 23. While the court's valuation of the indemnification claim
may be correct, the trustee is given wide discretion to make this determination for the estate. See
FRBP 9019; cases cited in note 37. Further, even if the court's valuation aligned perfectly with the
trustee's valuation, the mutual release of claims was in the best interests of the estate. The Cadle
Company's bid was only $12,500 more than the cash flowing to the estate in the proposed
settlement. This additional money is worth far less to the estate than the release of the $2 million
dollar claim that the trustee bargained for in the settlement.
114 See, for example, In re Edwards, 228 BR 552, 568-71 (Bankr ED Pa 1998); In re Kay,
223 BR 816, 820-22 (Bankr MD Fla 1998) (invalidating a mutual release of claims under the
Rule 9019 standard of review); In re Pennsylvania Truck Lines,Inc, 150 BR 595, 598-99 (Bankr
ED Pa 1992) (holding that Rule 9019, not §363, governs the approval of a settlement of mutual
claims).
115 Pennsylvania Truck Lines, 150 BR at 599. This is an example of a case that would have
been overturned by Martin. If all settlements are sales, then this distinction would not matter and
the stricter requirements of § 363 would apply. The court in PennsylvaniaTruck Lines disagreed
with this interpretation: "I stand by [the] distinction between settlements of pre-petition claims
and post-petition sales of assets." Id, citing In re Neshaminy Office Building Associates,
62 BR 798, 805 (Bankr ED Pa 1986) ("I do not believe it is proper to equate the settlement of
this controversy over conflicting claims to Neshaminy Plaza with the sale of that property.").
116 See, for example, In re Grant Broadcastingof Philadelphia,Inc, 71 BR 390, 398 (Bankr
ED Pa 1987).
112
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Edwards,"' the court analyzed a settlement under Rule 9019 despite its
being part of a large § 363 sale." The court upheld the trustee's
judgment in settling the claims despite the debtor's wish to hold out for
a higher amount: "While no one will ever know whether any additional
dollars would have been forthcoming ... the prejudice to creditors in

rejecting the settlement in favor of more costly and protracted litigation
... is too great."" The complexity and urgency of settlements involving
mutual release of claims therefore makes it best to leave discretion in
the hands of the trustee and not to require § 363 analysis.
C.

Would Court Involvement Harm the Bargaining Position of
the Estate?

The circuit courts did not consider how deviating from the
nonbankruptcy baseline rule and applying § 363's notice and hearing
requirements could harm an estate's bargaining power. For example,
when the trustee settles one of many similar claims against the estate,
the other claimants could benefit from knowledge of the settlement.
There is an inherent tradeoff when a trustee comes to court to gain
approval of a settlement: the court validates the action, but the terms
of the sale or settlement become public.'20
This tradeoff was recognized in In re Alterra Healthcare Corp."'
The court was presented with a motion by a third party to disclose
records of a settlement made by the debtor, Alterra, with third parties.
The court modified a seal order and made public the terms of a
settlement that would have remained private in the absence of court
involvement. The debtor claimed that it "would not have filed the
settlements with the Court if it had known the Court may unseal them
later."22 The debtor asserted that the unsettled claimants would want
to go to trial after the disclosure instead of settling their claims. The
court held that the debtor had not shown enough prejudice, because
there were multiple claimants who would want to "seek an early
settlement to ensure they receive[d] a significant share of the
shrinking pie."I24
117 228 BR 552 (Bankr ED Pa 1998).
118 Id at 568-71.
119 Id at 571.

120 See 11 USC § 107(a)-(b). Sections 107(a) and 107(b) provide that all filings with the
bankruptcy court become public records with a few limited exceptions-none of which encompass
the bargaining power lost for future negotiations.
121 353 BR 66 (Bankr D Del 2006).
122 Id at 72.
123 Id at 73.

124 Id at 72-73 (reasoning that the possibility of future settlements was not prejudiced by
publication of the records).
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Although the debtor and the court disagreed whether the
disclosure of information changed the parties' bargaining positions, it
is possible to imagine a slightly different situation in which the other
claimants would benefit from the settlement's disclosure. In such
cases, the debtor would be harmed by § 363's mandatory court
approval because the other claimants would have improved their
bargaining positions. Further, this may cause a chilling effect on
settlements, because the trustee may be hesitant even to entertain the
possibility of a settlement if she knows that the settlement will
become public. This results in more costly litigation and a higher
ultimate cost to the estate as the trustee foregoes cost-justified
settlements in favor of litigation. Memorializing a settlement in open
court under § 363 may affect bargaining with future claimants, even if
its terms are sealed. Accordingly, when disclosure of a settlement's
terms would harm the estate's bargaining position with future
claimants, the court should be less willing to require notice and a
hearing under §363 and should be receptive to the trustee's judgment
to settle the case outside the purview of the court.
D. Are There Potential Purchasers for the Claim?
Finally, courts should consider whether there are multiple
potential purchasers of a claim. If there is a market for the claim, then
the settlement looks more like a sale, and the auction procedures of
§ 363 should be used. In this case, a deviation from the nonbankruptcy
rule is warranted to maximize the value retrieved from the claim for
the estate.
In In re Resource Technology Corp,12 the court looked closely at
the number of potential purchasers of an alienable claim when
deciding to apply §363(m)'s good faith protections to a settlement.
"[I]n this case," the court found, "there was, in effect, a 'bidding'
process, thus bringing into play §363(m)'s policy of encouraging
12
When multiple bidders are
better offers by ensuring finality."m
seeking to buy an alienable claim, the court has an interest in
supervising the proceedings and applying the requirements of § 363.
When third parties show interest in purchasing the claim, it makes the
settlement look more like a sale that should be removed from the
discretion of the trustee in favor of the formal requirements of § 363.

2005 WL 1155683 (Bankr NDNY).
Id at *3. See also In re Lahijani,325 BR 282,288-89 (BAP 9th Cir 2005) (noting that the
auction procedures of § 363 are meant to attract higher bids and ensure that the "optimal value
is realized by the estate").
125
126
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In sum, a settlement's nonbankruptcy characteristics should be
examined to determine whether review under § 363 is appropriate.
These characteristics include (1) whether the cause of action is
alienable, (2) whether the settlement agreement involves a mutual
release of claims, (3) the implications of requiring disclosure on future
litigation by the estate, and (4) the presence or likelihood of multiple
potential purchasers. The presence of these characteristics suggests
that a settlement is more like a sale and would benefit from § 363
protections. Their absence suggests that a settlement is best left to the
trustee's discretion.
E. The Fifth Circuit Revisited
This section applies the above framework to the facts of the Fifth
Circuit's decision in In re Moore.The Fifth Circuit held that settlements
are sometimes sales but failed to articulate a framework. Applying this
Comment's framework shows that the case should have come out the
other way.
In In re Moore, the Fifth Circuit held that the settlement of
reverse veil-piercing and fraudulent transfer claims by the trustee
required § 363 analysis by the bankruptcy court.1' The court reasoned
that a major creditor's offer to buy the cause of action for $50,000
would bring a higher value to the estate than a $37,500 settlement
offer that included the release of a potential $12 million indemnity
claim held against the estate. The court simply noted that the trustee
was required to maximize the value of the estate under § 363.',
Analysis under this Comment's framework suggests that the trustee's
settlement should have been upheld without requiring § 363 analysis.
As a threshold matter, these causes of action were alienable
under state law, so there is no automatic exception from the
requirements of § 363. This determination does not end the analysis,
however, because the settlement of an alienable claim may still
require § 363 procedures.129
Under this Comment's proposed framework, the court would
next balance the remaining three factors. The second factor-whether
there was a mutual release of claims-cuts against requiring § 363
analysis in this case. The trustee was in a better position than the court
to determine the value of the $12 million claim against the estate
127
128
129

See Moore, 608 F3d at 266.
See id.
See Part IV.B.
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when negotiating the settlement. The mutual release of claims
frustrates the mechanics of § 363 because the settlement includes the
dismissal of a contingent claim against the estate. The trustee has
better information about the claim against the estate and is better able
to weigh competing interests about how to proceed, such as
accounting for the disclosure costs of seeking court approval. This
informational and decisionmaking advantage supports the primary
position that the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee in a bankruptcy
proceeding. By applying § 363, the Fifth Circuit's decision seems to
give more weight to the major creditor's interest in the specific cause
of action rather than the trustee's discretion and relative competence
to make decisions for the estate as a whole. It is just as likely that the
settlement of the claims against the estate was worth more on an
expected value basis than the $13,000 overbid by the major creditor."
This type of agreement would benefit from the expertise and
independent decisionmaking authority of the trustee.1
The third factor, whether court involvement would harm the
estate's bargaining power in future litigation, does not seem
implicated by the facts in Moore because there was no future litigation
pending between the parties and no similar litigation claims. This
factor, therefore, is indeterminate. The fourth factor, whether there
were potential bidders, strongly influenced the Fifth Circuit's decision.
This should not have been determinative, however, because there was
only one other potential "bidder" in this case. Therefore, the auction
procedures of § 363 would be less useful than if there were a wider
market with many bidders seeking the claim. Because the major
creditor was the only bidder, this factor cuts against § 363 analysis.
Applying this Comment's framework shows that this decision
should probably not have been examined under § 363. The threshold
test would not automatically exempt § 363 analysis because the claims
were alienable at state law. The court would then consider the other
three factors. The second factor militates strongly against § 363 analysis
as there was a mutual release of claims. The third factor is
indeterminate because the estate's bargaining power was not
jeopardized. Finally, the fourth factor cuts slightly against § 363 analysis
because there was not a market of multiple potential bidders who
would benefit from the § 363 protections. In sum, two factors, the
second and fourth, cut against § 363 analysis, while the third factor is
insufficient on its own to support analysis under § 363. Accordingly, the
See note 113.
See Part IV.B. This analysis would also require a reconsideration of the Third Circuit's
opinion in In re Martin. That case also dealt with a mutual release of claims, and therefore the
factors would seem to cut against § 363's application.
130
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settlement had qualities distinct from a sale, and there was no
justification for deviating from the nonbankruptcy rule by applying the
§ 363 sale requirements.
CONCLUSION

Circuit courts are split on how to analyze settlements of claims
under the Bankruptcy Code. This Comment resolves the split by using
the nonbankruptcy baseline framework as the method for courts to
categorize settlements. In deciding how to review specific settlements, a
court should look at the qualities of the settlement outside bankruptcywhether the litigation claim is alienable outside bankruptcy, whether the
settlement includes a mutual release of litigation claims, whether court
involvement would harm the estate's future bargaining position, and
whether there are multiple potential purchasers for the claim-and then
match those qualities with the purposes of § 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.
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